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ABSTRACT
The Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) is being used as a temporary storage facility for transuranic (TRU) waste generated by the 
United States nuclear weapons program. There has been, and continues to be, a very large effort to characterize, 
certify, and ship this legacy waste, in compliance with all applicable regulations, to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico for permanent disposal. Nondestructive assay (NDA) was used to characterize 
TRU waste for shipment/disposal to WIPP during the 3100 m3 Project. This paper describes the NDA systems, 
summarizes NDA history at the RWMC, and summarizes the lessons learned during the 3100 m3 Project. 
In 1995 the State of Idaho, the Department of Energy, and the United States Navy signed a multifaceted legal 
document requiring Department of Energy to remove all forms of radioactive waste from the INEEL. One aspect of 
the agreement is to remove 3100 m3 of TRU waste prior to January 1, 2003 from RWMC. In October of 1996 
congress allocated funding for the 3100 m3 Project to fulfill the agreement. 
Prior to 3100 m3 Project TRU waste radioassay research and development was performed at the INEEL (1980s - 
1990s). The preliminary assay operation years covered in this paper are 1993 – 1997. During the preliminary assay 
operation years the NDA efforts relied on a Passive/Active Neutron assay system coupled with a gamma 
spectrometry system. Initial radioassay efforts saw the: 
x Determination of the relative isotopic composition of each container. 
x Development of a total uncertainty measurement method. 
x Estimation of the total uncertainty of each measurement. 
x Development and integration of a gamma-ray based isotopic mass ratio method. 
The WIPP certified production radioassay commenced in late September of 1997. Production assay operation 
continued through the completion of the 3100 m3 Project in late 2002. The state of the NDA systems and 
methodologies at the close of the 3100 m3 Project reflects a long list of applied knowledge and experiences: 
x No one assay technique that can be applied to all waste forms. 
x The waste assay technique must be appropriate to the waste form and waste matrix. 
x Knowledge of the waste form and packaging is absolutely necessary and should be as extensive as possible. 
x Limitations of each assay technique must be well known. 
x Calibration requirements need to be flexible enough to take advantage of advanced and different NDA 
methods. 
x Calibration efforts must be rigorous and well documented. 
x Throughput requirements should be well defined. 
x Accuracy and precision goals should be well defined. 
x Sensitivity goals should be well defined. 
x Quality assurance methods should be well defined. 
x Software and Program Documentation should be considered “Living Documents”. 
x Automation of functions was the most desirable solution to “Special Cases”. 
x Advantageous to have well trained and experienced personnel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) is being used as a temporary storage facility for transuranic (TRU) waste generated by the 
United States nuclear weapons program. There has been, and continues to be, a very large effort to characterize, 
certify, and ship this legacy waste, in compliance with all applicable regulations, to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico for permanent disposal. Nondestructive assay (NDA) was used to characterize 
TRU waste for shipment/disposal to WIPP during 3100 m3 Project. The NDA equipment that performed radioassay 
for characterization was housed at the Stored Waste Examination Pilot Plant (SWEPP) at the RWMC. Three 
distinctly different radioassay measurement systems were in use over the life of the 3100 m3 Project. This paper 
describes the three NDA systems, summarizes NDA history at the RWMC, and summarizes the lessons learned 
during the 3100 m3 Project. 
The effort to ship TRU waste to WIPP is being driven by the Idaho Settlement Agreement [1] which is a 
multifaceted legal document requiring the Department of Energy (DOE) to remove all forms of radioactive waste 
from the INEEL. One aspect of the agreement is to remove 3100 m3 of TRU waste prior to January 1, 2003 from the 
RWMC. This agreement between the State of Idaho, the Department of Energy, and the United States Navy was 
signed in October of 1995. Funding for this project was allocated in October of 1996 by congress. Prior to this time, 
work to characterize TRU waste was performed under the WIPP Experimental Test Program (WETP). The WETP 
project started in the early 1980’s and continued until the creation of the 3100 m3 Project. The court-approved 
milestone was achieved on September 30, 2002. 
RADIOASSAY SYSTEMS 
RWMC used 3 different measurement systems over the life of the 3100 m3 Project to perform NDA. A 
Passive/Active Neutron (PAN) assay system coupled with a high-resolution gamma spectrometry system was used 
initially. The high-resolution gamma systems were the SWEPP Gamma-ray Spectrometer (SGRS) and Waste Assay 
Gamma Spectrometer (WAGS). In their support roles to the PAN assay system, the gamma systems determined the 
relative isotopic material composition data, which were combined with the PAN response data to determine absolute 
estimates of the radionuclide inventory and compute the associated derived quantities; total alpha activity, TRU 
alpha activity, fissile gram equivalent. During the last year of the 3100 m3 Project, SGRS and WAGS were also 
used, independent of the PAN assay system, as (standalone) absolute assay systems. 
As a whole, the three NDA systems assayed 19,669 distinct containers during the production period of the 3100 m3
Project. Based on radioassay requirements 83% of the drums assayed by an NDA system were acceptable for 
shipment to WIPP. 
PAN/Gamma 
In 1983 Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) delivered a PAN assay system to the INEEL, the system was 
classified as a second-generation PAN assay system. It was a successor to the 1st generation PAN assay system, 
which was developed for safeguards measurements. Whereas, the 2nd generation PAN assay system was adapted to 
measure TRU waste. There were a number of 2nd generation PAN assay systems produced by LANL and delivered 
to different DOE facilities. Each PAN assay system was slightly different in design and construction, and therefore 
had to be treated as a one of a kind system. The closest systems in design to the INEEL PAN assay system were 
delivered to the Savannah River Site and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). The PAN assay 
system gave RWMC the capability to assay 55-gal TRU waste drums. The TRU waste sent to WIPP during the 
3100 m 3 Project from INEEL was received from RFETS. Prior to receipt of the PAN assay system, INEEL relied 
solely on the transportation records and special nuclear material records that were received by INEEL from RFETS 
to determine the radionuclide content of a container. The PAN assay system was used from the start of the 
radioassay program at the RWMC through the life of the 3100 m3 Project. 
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A complete description of the PAN assay system is given in the engineering design file (EDF)-606 [2]. The major 
structure is an enclosure that surrounds the drum on all four sides, top, and bottom and can be classified as a 4S
detector. The outer skin of the enclosure is constructed of aluminum sheets, inside is housed a layered arrangement 
of graphite, non-borated and borated polyethylene, and cadmium wrapped and bare helium-3 neutron detectors. In 
the PAN assay system design, the shielding around the different detector banks was arranged such that one set of 
detector banks were surrounded by cadmium, and borated rubber, and moderator and were sensitive to fast neutrons 
only. The second set of detector banks were surrounded by moderator only and were sensitive to neutrons of all 
energies. The first set of detector banks was called the “shielded detector banks” and the second set was called the 
“bare detector banks”. 
The PAN assay system operated in both passive and active modes, both of which were needed to quantify the final 
assay values. The passive mode was sensitive to neutrons produced by spontaneous fission, from Pu-240 primarily, 
and (D,n) interactions in the waste matrix. The active mode was sensitive to neutrons produced by thermal neutron 
induced fission. 
In the passive mode, coincidence counting techniques were used to differentiate neutrons produced by spontaneous 
fission from uncorrelated neutrons produced by (D,n) interactions and cosmic background. Initially, the PAN 
passive coincidence mode operated using “one shot” coincidence gates [3]. Two coincidence gates were used; the 
long-gate mode and the short-gate mode. The long-gate mode operated with a time gate window of 250 Ps and 
detected coincidence events originating from all the detectors in the enclosure, both bare and shielded. The short-
gate mode operated with a time gate window of 45 Ps and detected coincidence events originating from only the 
shielded detectors in the enclosure. The use of two coincidence modes was developed to extend the dynamic range 
of the PAN passive mode from a few grams of plutonium to at least 200 g of plutonium. Originally, the PAN assay 
system’s analysis software selected the short-gate coincidence mode results if that mode’s coincidence count rate 
determined a measured plutonium mass of greater than 20 g. The long-gate coincidence mode results were used if 
that mode’s coincidence rate produced a measured plutonium mass that was between 10 g and 20 g. The choice of 
passive mode results was changed to whichever passive mode results had the smallest relative uncertainty on the 
plutonium mass and the algorithm change was made in the early 1990’s. Practical experience also showed that the 
one-shot coincidence methods would underestimate the mass of plutonium due to detector pulse pileup and dead 
time losses. As a result, in 1996 a shift register coincidence (SRC) system, which virtually eliminates dead time 
losses, was added to the PAN passive mode acquisition hardware.  
The active mode of the PAN assay system is based on the differential dieaway technique [4]. This mode used a 
deuterium on tritium (D-T) neutron generator to produce a series of bursts of 14 MeV neutrons which moderated to 
thermal energies and interacted with Pu-239, U-233 or U-235 to produce fission that in turn produced 2 or more fast 
fission neutrons. As a result, the neutron levels (and consequently the neutron detector count rates) inside the PAN 
assay system fall off  (or die away) after each D-T generator pulse with an exponential dieaway. Two time-gate 
windows were set following each neutron generator burst. The first time-gate window was set to accumulate counts 
when the interrogation neutrons were thermalized and most likely able to produce fission is referred to as the active 
mode early gate. The second time gate window, referred to as the active mode late gate, was set when all the 
interrogation neutrons have died away and only background and (D,n) neutrons would be detected. The early gate 
time window was set to be from 700 Ps to 2,700 Ps and the late gate time window was set to be from 5,700 Ps to 
15,700 Ps. The late gate count rate was used to correct the early gate count rate for background and (D,n) neutrons. 
The net count rate was then used to derive the active mode plutonium mass. By this approach the active mode 
automatically corrected for background.  
Because the active mode used an interrogating neutron flux, it was thought to be inherently more sensitive than the 
passive mode. Consequently, the active mode assay results were selected as the reported results when the plutonium 
mass was small. Originally the decision point between active and passive results was based on the active plutonium 
mass being 10 g. That is, when the active plutonium mass was above 10 g the passive assay results were reported 
and when the active plutonium mass was below 10 g the active assay results were reported. In 1996, the decision 
criterion for reporting active mode results versus passive mode results was changed such that the active mode results 
were reported if the passive mode plutonium mass plus 2V (1.95 times its counting error) were less than 5 g. 
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The INEEL PAN assay system, operated in conjunction with a gamma system (operating in an isotopic-mass-ratio 
mode), that was used to quantify the mass values for the following nuclides: Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, 
Pu-241, U-233, U-235, and U-238. The PAN assay system directly measured a fissile signal due to Pu-239 or U-235 
fission (active mode) or Pu-240 spontaneous fission (passive mode). A gamma system, either the SGRS or the 
WAGS was used to supplement the PAN measurements by providing the relative mass ratios of Pu-238/Pu-239, 
Pu-240/Pu-239, Pu-241/Pu-239, Am-241/Pu-239, Am-241/U-235, U-235/Pu-239, U-233/Pu-239 and U-235/U-238. 
The gamma system analysis code for mass ratios analysis was called the SWEPP Gamma Analysis Package (SGAP) 
[5]. The mass ratio data and the PAN data were combined using the SWEPP Assay System (SAS) analysis code [6] 
to produce isotopic mass values for the nuclides listed above. This combined assay method is referred to in this 
document as PAN/Gamma assay system. 
The PAN/Gamma assay system was in operation at the start of the project (September of 1997) and continued to 
assay waste containers until it was placed in standby mode (June of 2002). From the start of the project and until 
December of 2000, the PAN assay system operated in conjunction with SGRS. In mid-December of 2000, the 
WAGS system was placed into operation. The PAN instrument could then be provided mass ratio data from either 
the SGRS or the WAGS to support the PAN measurements. The PAN/Gamma assay system was certified to ship 
both debris and sludge waste to the WIPP [7,8,9,10]. 
The PAN/Gamma assay system operated prior to implementation of the Contact-Handled Waste Acceptance Criteria 
(CH-WAC) [11] under the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). The WIPP WAC required daily quality control 
checks (PAN), daily/weekly calibrations on the Gamma system, replicate/batch, annual calibration conformation, 
and Performance Demonstration Program (PDP). The quality control events will not be addressed in this report. The 
technical procedure (TPR) used for the daily operation of the PAN assay system was TPR-1573 [12] while the 
gamma system was operated under TPR-1588 [13]. 
SGRS Absolute and SGRS Mass Ratio 
The SGRS system was the first permanent gamma system placed in service. Prior to the SGRS system, temporary 
gamma systems were used to perfect the isotopic measurement method. The SGRS system had four high-resolution 
high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray spectrometers and a shielding enclosure with 15.24 cm thick pre-World 
War II steel walls. The SGRS system’s enclosure had 4 penetrations in the shield to position 4 HPGe detectors. A 
waste drum was placed on a drum rotator inside the enclosure by the forklift; the drum rotator was used to rotate the 
drum while gamma spectra were accumulated [14]. 
An Ethernet communication link was used to communicate between the detector acquisition hardware and gamma 
acquisition computer. Initially, the gamma acquisition computer was a VAX station 4000 Model 60 computer. The 
VAX based system was later replaced by a Windows NT based personal computer (PC). Each HPGe gamma 
spectrometer was connected to a high voltage power supply, a low-noise preamplifier with dual-energy pulser 
interface, a linear amplifier, and an analog-to-digital converter, which was modified to process dual-energy pulser 
signals to and from the preamplifier and an acquisition interface module.  
The initial software package used to acquire and analyze SGRS gamma spectrum data consisted of three modules 
[15]: 
x Gamma spectrum acquisition and control program (GCS). 
x VAX Gamma-ray analysis program (VAXGAP). 
x Actinide mass ratio calculation program (BGAV). 
The main core of this software package was VAXGAP [16,17]. The program’s long pedigree resulted from 
extensive testing, use, and national validation and verification in the Radiation Measurements Laboratory at the 
INEEL, Test Reactor Area. 
The SGRS software package went through three major changes over the life of the NDA project. 
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1. A method was developed to successfully sum gamma spectra from different HPGe detectors with 
different energy calibrations without a loss in energy resolution. The isotopic mass ratio calculations in 
the SGRS software were changed to take advantage of the new spectrum summing method. This 
change was implemented in BGAV3 and it greatly improved the accuracy and consistency of the 
SGRS mass ratio results [15]. 
2. Due to the change of the SGRS computer from a VAX to a PC in 2001, a completely new software 
package was developed and implemented.  The new package was called the SWEPP Gamma Analysis 
Package (SGAP) [18]. Like its predecessor this software package consists of three major modules:  
x The acquisition and control module (GCPC). 
x Gamma spectrum analysis module (PCGAP). 
x Isotopic mass ratio calculation module (SAAC).  
3. In May of 2002, an absolute assay analysis module developed at INEEL was added to the SGRS 
software package. The absolute assay package was called SWEPP Absolute Analysis Package (SAP) 
[19] and it allowed the SGRS to operate as a standalone absolute assay unit, separate from the 
PAN/Gamma operation. As with SGAP, SAP had three modules, the first two modules were the same 
modules that were used in SGAP: 
x Acquisition and control module (GCPC). 
x Gamma spectrum analysis module (PCGAP). 
x Isotopic mass and derived quantities calculation module (SRAC). 
The absolute assay operation of the SGRS system did not require any modifications to the hardware or the 
acquisition/gamma-spectrum-analysis software. The only difference between mass ratio mode and absolute assay 
mode was the analysis performed at the tail end of the process. To the SGRS system operator the only difference 
was the selection of a different icon on the computer monitor. This meant that the SGRS system could be switched 
from mass ratio mode to the absolute assay mode (and vice versa) with no time delays to reconfigure the hardware 
or to recalibrate. SGRS system was totally compatible for either mass ratio operation to support PAN assay or for 
standalone absolute assay operation. However in order to distinguish between the two modes, the SGRS system 
when operated as an absolute assay system is referred to as SGRS Absolute in this paper. 
SGRS Absolute detected and directly measured the mass concentrations of Am-241, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, 
Pu-241, U-233, U-235, and U-238. Certification included both debris and sludge waste types [10]. This instrument 
was placed into operation under the requirements of the CH-WAC. Therefore, the system was required to have a 
daily quality control event, background event, a weekly interfering matrix test, and participate in an annual PDP test. 
The quality control events will not be addressed in this report. The daily operating procedure, TPR-1588 [13], was 
modified to include operating the SGRS in either the isotopic mass ratio mode or the absolute assay mode. 
WAGS Absolute and WAGS Mass Ratio 
The WAGS system was originally purchased to perform the same functions as the SGRS system; provide isotopic 
mass ratio data (in parallel with the SGRS) to support the PAN analysis. The WAGS system operated as a second 
isotopic gamma system in support of the PAN assays to reduce the backlog produced by the gamma spectrum 
acquisition. It was placed into operation at SWEPP in December of 2000. 
The WAGS system was designed to analyze the radionuclide content of a 55-gal drum using a combination of six 
HPGe gamma-ray detectors. The housing for the WAGS system was a Canberra Q-2 rectangular enclosure with 
10.16 cm thick low-background steel shielding. Penetration holes in the shield provided for six HPGe detectors and 
three transmission sources. A drum transport system moved drums in and out of the system and a rotator/lift 
assembly lifted and rotated the drum in the enclosure during data acquisition. This system was fully automated in 
that a maximum of six drums were loaded onto the conveyor and sequentially moved through the assay system. 
Operator interface other than data entry was not required [20]. 
(WM’04 Conference, February 29- March 4, 2004, Tucson, AZ) 
When operating as an isotopic gamma system in support of the PAN assay, the WAGS data acquisition hardware 
and software were duplicates of those used on the SGRS system. The major exception was that only three detectors 
were used in the WAGS system and four detectors were used in the SGRS system. This meant that the WAGS 
system did not use all six detectors when it operated in the isotopic mass ratio mode. 
In 2002, the WAGS system was converted to operate as a standalone absolute assay system, independent of the PAN 
assay system. To distinguish absolute assay operation from its isotopic mass ratio operation the term WAGS 
Absolute is used when WAGS operated as an absolute assay system. The reconfiguration required both changes in 
hardware and software. Under the absolute assay operation, the WAGS transmission source housings contained 
three 5 mCi Ba-133 radioactive sources and the shield doors would open to allow diametric attenuation 
measurements of the drum contents. As a standalone absolute assay system, a PC with an OS/2 operating system 
controlled the WAGS system. Canberra Industries provided the acquisition and analysis software; i.e., Genie PC and 
Gamma Waste Assay System. During an assay, energy dependent attenuation coefficients were calculated based on 
the analysis. These attenuation coefficients and/or weight based density coefficients were used in conjunction with 
the gamma-ray spectral analysis to determine the radionuclide content of a drum [20]. 
WAGS Absolute was placed into operation in mid-May of 2002 and operated through the end of the 3100 m3
Project. During this time 3000, drums were assayed with this system. Certification included both debris and sludge 
waste types [10]. This instrument was placed into operation under the requirements of CH-WAC. Therefore, the 
system was required to have a daily quality control event, background event, a weekly interfering matrix test, and 
participate in an annual PDP test. The quality control events will not be addressed in this report. The daily operating 
procedure for WAGS Absolute was TPR-1654 [21]. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The lessons learned are broken into sections, the preliminary assay operation period and the production period. The 
preliminary assay operation is the time prior to September 29, 1997, the official startup date for production. The 
court approved milestone was met on September 30, 2003. 
Preliminary Assay Operation (January, 1994 – September, 1997) 
During this time period, the PAN assay system in combination with the SGRS system was the only radioassay 
method in service at SWEPP. The operating and analysis software was replaced with the Nuclear Quality Assurance 
(NQA) - 2 compliant software, object oriented software package – the SAS software operated on a 486 class PC. 
The major hardware additions were the SRC system in 1996 and the upgrades to the acquisition hardware in 1997, 
April – August. The PAN hardware upgrade in 1997 included a new neutron generator and pulse forming network, 
upgraded signal preamplifiers, and a digital link between preamps and gating module processors. Following the 
hardware upgrade a new baseline calibration was completed on the PAN assay system [22]. Based on the 1997 
calibration, the PAN active mode range was from 0 g to 15 g and the passive mode had a range of 1 g to 160 g of 
weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). 
After the new baseline calibration of the PAN assay system, a series of experiments were completed that assessed 
the impact of cosmic radiation to the PAN passive mode count rates. The PAN SRC system was allowed to run 
continuously to determine the frequency at which cosmic showers were detected. During that time period it was 
noted that cosmic showers occurred on a frequency of about once every 10 hours. The cosmic showers could be 
readily identifiable in the passive assay by a discrepancy between measured accidental coincidence count rate and 
the calculated accidental coincidence count rate. As a result, the SAS software included a provision to check the 
agreement between the measured and calculated accidental coincidence rates. Disagreement was a clear indication 
that a cosmic shower, or some other outside phenomenon, had occurred. Consequently, the occurrence of such an 
abnormality generated a simple error message to the PAN assay system operator. The corrective action, if such a 
message occurred, would be to repeat the assay.  
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As previously stated the PAN assay relied on default mass fractions for the plutonium isotopes. The original mass 
fractions from LANL were not substantiated by any references. Therefore, a study was initiated to arrive at the 
appropriate set of mass fractions to use for the plutonium isotopics in WGPu. This study examined over 2,000 
shipping records from RFETS, which contained isotopic mass data. From this analysis a set of mass fractions were 
determined [23]. 
The first Performance Demonstration Program test, PDP Cycle 1, was completed in the summer of 1996.  This PDP 
test showed that in order to meet the PDP criterion for precision, the PAN passive mode count time needed to be 
increased from 600 s to 1200 s on waste assays where the passive mode assay data could potentially be used as the 
reported data. However, this increase in count time was not required for waste forms where the active mode was the 
designated mode of choice; the active mode was the designated assay mode for sludge waste forms. This PDP cycle 
also further emphasized the need for total uncertainty tasks based on specific waste forms rather than broad based 
generic waste forms. 
The original assumptions that were made in the early years were that the waste from RFETS was homogenous in 
nature, the only Am-241 present was grown in from the decay of Pu-241 in WGPu, and U-235 was not present. 
Assaying was originally done with the PAN assay system only. However it became apparent that the PAN assay 
results needed to be corrected for americium quantities above that which was accounted from the Pu-241 decay. 
Therefore a gamma system was added. Since the gamma system had multiple detectors it quickly showed the 
radioactivity was stratified in sludge waste as opposed to the original uniform distribution assumption that was used 
in the data analysis. Also, U-235 and U-238 were detected in the waste.  
Due to the process time in a gamma system, it became apparent a second isotopic mass ratio (gamma) system was 
needed to improve productivity. 
Production Assay Operation 
There were several lessons learned during the 3100 m3 Project that required changes to be made to the system. Some 
of the changes that occurred were due to the assaying of new waste types, while other changes occurred with the 
revisions of the WAC. 
At the start of production, the only INEEL NDA system approved for radioassay was the PAN/Gamma assay 
system, consisting of the PAN system and the SGRS system. The primary waste form that was sent to WIPP prior to 
2000 was graphite. The total measurement uncertainty (TMU) for graphite waste forms was completed in 1998 
[24,25]. This waste form was chosen first because it was considered to be the most benign, as far as neutron 
absorption was concerned, and was expected to be the least challenging for the neutron based assay method, the 
PAN/Gamma technique. The first shipments to WIPP of graphite waste containers occurred in April of 1999. A 
significant number of containers of graphite had to be re-assayed or recalculated with SAS the software in 
Transuranic Reporting, Inventory, and Processing System (TRIPS) because the original TMU evaluation only 
included the assay results for the PAN’s passive mode. Graphite containers that were re-assayed after the new 
requirements of the Waste Analysis Plan were incorporated into production, this occurred in the spring of 2000. The 
first lesson learned from this was if the original TMU had encompassed both the active and passive modes of the 
PAN/Gamma assay system recalculation efforts would not have been required. Secondly, recalculation as opposed 
to re-assay, was possible because the data collection procedures already met the requirements of the Waste Analysis 
Plan. Radioassay requirements at the INEEL exceeded requirements to assure data integrity. 
The PAN/Gamma assay system’s TMU evaluation was completed for aqueous sludge in 2000 [26]. Using the 
sampling/verification statistical approach for TMU analysis, radionuclide contents from radiochemical analysis of 
sample cores were correlated with the radioassay data collected by the PAN/Gamma assay system and were used to 
develop the TMU, bias and precision coefficients. The TMU limit was conservatively set, but this limit was later 
extended to be more reflective of the true NDA limit. The lesson learned was to fully implement the ranges in the 
beginning instead of modifying the certification limits later in time. 
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Beginning with SAS Version 3.0, the data from the PAN assay system was uploaded directly to TRIPS. Previously 
PAN assay results were uploaded to the RWMC Data Management System, which was later replaced by TRIPS. All 
radioassay data collected prior to the release of SAS Version 3 were required to be recalculated with the most 
current version of the SAS software before the data could be sent to WIPP. In 2000 all the data that had not been 
recalculated using SAS Version 3 and that were in the Radioassay Level 1 Data Validation queue were permanently 
rejected thereby requiring those containers to be re-assayed. The major lessons learned were to attempt to have the 
requirements for the radioassay systems, data acquisition, data reduction, data review, and database population as 
soon as possible, and make the systems flexible enough to evolve over time. 
Evaluating the measured mass fraction data derived by the SGRS assay system was initiated to revisit the issue of 
default mass fractions derived from shipping records and the results of the new analysis are presented in EDF-1609 
[23]. From a regulatory agency’s prospective, the SGRS data should be considered more defensible because they 
were taken on a DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certified instrument. The mass fractions determined in the 
SGRS data survey agreed to at least three significant figures with those determined from RFETS shipping records 
[27]. Because INEEL spent the time to determine the origin, handling, processes, packaging, etc. of its waste, the 
data collected was more accurate than the data provided by the waste generator. 
For many of the waste assays there was a problem in measuring Pu-238 activity and Pu-240 activity leading up to 
the respective mass determinations. With respect to Pu-238 measurements, this isotope was present in very minute 
amounts in WGPu and in a large number of assays this isotope was not detected, or the measured activity had a very 
high uncertainty. Thus, the measured mass would be very uncertain at best. With respect to Pu-240, the decay of this 
nuclide produces only one viable gamma line at 160 keV. This gamma line is badly interfered with by gamma lines 
from the decay of other TRU radionuclides; hence, the resulting mass determination for Pu-240 was often suspect. 
Since Pu-239 activity was much easier to measure, the conclusion was that the plutonium isotope mass 
determinations should be based on Pu-239 using default mass fractions. The default mass fractions were in this case 
derived from measurements of waste drums in the INEEL inventory and were averaged over thousands of waste 
assays; hence, their uncertainties were much better than any single drum measurement. However, the SAS software 
checked the measured Pu-240/Pu-239 mass ratio and the Pu-241/Pu-239 mass ratio from the gamma system to 
assure that the plutonium in each individual drum measurement fit within the 95% confidence bounds of WGPu 
before it applied the default mass fractions. If a measured plutonium mass ratio datum was found to be outside those 
bounds, an error message was generated stating that the plutonium may not be weapons grade. Since americium and 
uranium were not covered, the measured mass of Am-241, U-235 and U-238 were reported in all cases. INEEL 
learned quickly that different regulatory viewpoints were often encountered in waste certification realm. Being able 
to identify the regulatory viewpoint of the auditor and defend the path chosen by the program was the best method 
for (re)certification of the NDA systems. 
The SAS software stored the actual measured assay value in the SAS assay report file, even though it might be 
negative or less than the detection limits. Prior to the year 2000, negative or less than detection limit numbers were 
also uploaded to TRIPS. In the year 2000, negative or less than detection limit values were reported to TRIPS as a “-
1”, indicating a number that was technically not detected. These changes in the SAS to TRIPS data link did not 
change the way negative or less than detection limit values were reported to WIPP. TRIPS had always uploaded a “-
1” to the WIPP Waste Information System indicating that the corresponding entry was looked for but not detected. 
The lessons learned were to clearly identify the sensitivity of the instruments and design software that could easily 
be modified for new WIPP requirements. 
In December of 2000, the VAX workstation for the SGRS system was replaced with a PC with a Windows NT 
operating system. The SGRS acquisition and analysis software was replaced with SGAP. INEEL learned that all 
hardware and software has a finite lifetime. Maintenance and upgrades need to be planned for during the life of any 
project. 
In December of 2000 the WAGS system was placed into operation to increase the throughput of the PAN/Gamma 
assay system. Because the WAGS system was similar to the SGRS system, the PAN assay system could then 
receive isotopic mass ratio data from either gamma system. The paperwork for the WAGS system was not sent to 
WIPP and this oversight resulted in suspension of shipments to WIPP. When shipments were reinstated to WIPP, the 
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WAGS system was not allowed to support characterization until CBFO and Environmental Protection Agency had 
approved it. The WAGS system was approved for characterization in support of shipments to WIPP in August of 
2001. The lesson learned was to verify the receipt of the paperwork by CBFO. 
The following waste streams had TMU assessments completed using the general TMU evaluation method given in 
management control procedure (MCP), MCP-2990: mixed metals [28], raschig rings [29], glass [30], filters [31], 
and combustibles [32]. The following waste streams had TMU assessments completed using the general TMU 
evaluation methods given in MCP-2991: organic setups [33], plastics [34], solidified organics and special setups 
[35], and miscellaneous cemented waste [36]. 
Waste forms containing significant quantities of lead and other heavy metals was considered a problem for the 
PAN/Gamma assay method and also for the absolute gamma assay methods. A TMU evaluation for PAN/Gamma 
assays on lead waste forms was never completed. However, the TMU evaluation for SGRS Absolute covered lead 
containing waste forms where the heavy metal concentration was less than 38 kg [37]. Canberra Industries 
performed a supplemental TMU evaluation for WAGS Absolute for lead-containing wastes [38]. The limits of the 
scaling factors are: 1) plutonium 414/129 keV photopeak mass ratio between 2 and 10, inclusive; 2) matrix density 
between 0.2 g/cc and 1.0 g/cc, inclusive; and 3) TMU relative standard deviation greater than or equal to 15%. The 
lessons learned were to know the capabilities and limitation of each system. 
EDF-2670 [39] was submitted to CBFO to extend the active mode calibration range from 15 g to 31 g of WGPu. 
With the approval of this document, approximately 800 drums were available for shipment to WIPP once the drums 
were reprocessed through data review processes. If full documented TMU limits and calibration ranges had been 
taken advantage of at the start of the certification process, this task would not have been needed. 
The presence of U-233 in the INEEL TRU waste was a continuing issue. The SGRS (and the WAGS) gamma 
spectrum analysis would on infrequent occasions record a positive identification of U-233 activity based on the 317 
keV gamma line from its decay. This particular gamma line is severely interfered with by the decay of Pu-239. To 
prevent an erroneous determination of the presence of U-233 the principal gamma energy for U-233 was changed 
from 317 keV to 291 keV. In addition, corroborating evidence required Bi-213, a decay daughter of U-233, be 
positively detected using the gamma peak at 440 keV. These modifications to the gamma assay analysis were 
implemented in the initial versions of SGAP and SAP. 
The PAN assay system was potentially a single point for failure for the 3100 m3 Project; therefore the decision was 
made to implement an absolute gamma assay system. A contract was awarded in 2001 to Canberra to convert the 
WAGS system to an absolute gamma system. Since the WAGS system had already been designed for this purpose 
this conversion did not require any physical changes to the WAGS system gamma enclosure however, a Ba-133 
source and different detectors were installed. The conversion also required a change in the computer and the 
operating system, a change in the acquisition, control and analysis software. In addition to the hardware and 
software changes, a completely new calibration was required and completed. The WAGS system began operation as 
an absolute assay system in May of 2002. 
As part of the INEEL Environmental Systems and Research Program (a research program separate from the 3100 m3
Project), a method was developed whereby simple gamma spectrometers, like the SGRS system, could be used 
effectively for absolute assay. The 3100 m3 Project office initiated implementation of the absolute assay analysis 
method on the SGRS system in 2001. The SGRS absolute software package was called SWEPP Absolute Assay 
Package (SAP). SGRS Absolute began operation in May of 2002. Initially, the SGRS absolute assay option was 
slated as a backup but it quickly was adopted as a primary absolute assay system. As a result, the PAN assay system 
was placed on standby and in August of 2002, the PAN assay system was deactivated.  
During 2001 it became apparent that the PAN SRC system was overly sensitive to neutron multiplication in some 
waste drums where the plutonium mass was greater than 100 g. This was most evident in high-mass plutonium filter 
drums. Algorithms in the SAS software were being developed for high-mass plutonium drums to compensate for 
this inadequacy however, these algorithms were never completed prior to the end of the project. The alternative to 
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assaying the drums with the PAN\Gamma assay system was to use SGRS Absolute, which was shown to be 
completely capable of assaying high-mass plutonium filter drums.  
During the aqueous sludge campaign, an independent technical reviewer noticed that drums containing high 
amounts of U-235 relative to the Pu-239 concentration calculated the uranium and plutonium concentrations 
incorrectly. SAS Version 4.0 eliminated this problem, but was never installed on the PAN assay system because the 
3100 m3 Project could be successfully completed without the upgrade. The solution to the software upgrade was to 
assay those containers with SGRS Absolute. 
In May 17, 2002, the new CH-WAC document was released by CBFO. The new CH-WAC required a lower limit of 
detection be determined for all the WIPP reportable quantities to be transferred to WIPP. If an assay measured value 
entry was less than its respective lower limit of detection, a message indicating such was to be placed in the data 
block in lieu of the measured value or zero. The new CH-WAC also removed the requirement of replicates and the 
batch size restriction. The CH-WAC required weekly surrogate measurements to be performed. It also required 
reporting TMU at the one-sigma level rather than the two-sigma level, which was the case in earlier versions of the 
WAC. SAS Version 4.0 incorporated all new CH-WAC requirements. The absolute gamma systems were compliant 
with the new CH-WAC. Lessons learned were to implement the software immediately or find an alternative method 
for compliance. 
EDF-2670, Revision 2 was released in June of 2002. This revision of the document extended the PAN active-mode 
range for solidified inorganic sludge wastes from 29 g to 47 g of plutonium fissile gram equivalent [40]. The lesson 
learned was that the full extent of TMU needs to be placed into operation once it was determined, being 
conservative increases operations costs at a later date. 
The PAN/Gamma assay system participated in all the required PDP cycles and passed all tests with two exceptions, 
PDP Cycle 5 and PDP Cycle 6. Failure in PDP Cycle 5 was not the failure of the PAN/Gamma assay system but was 
due to a source distribution loading in PDP aqueous sludge drum that was outside the range found in sludge waste 
forms. Failure in PDP Cycle 6 also involved the aqueous sludge drum; in this case the plutonium loading was 
outside the calibration range of the PAN active mode. In both cases, corrective actions were sent to CBFO and 
provisional approval for continued operation was granted. 
WAGS Absolute and SGRS Absolute participated in a PDP Cycle 8D before commencing assay operations. WAGS 
Absolute passed all tests and SRGS Absolute failed the bias test on the zero matrix drum. The failure was due to an 
erroneous drum mass entry in the SGRS assay parameter file. The zero matrix PDP measurement required a manual 
entry of the drum mass whereas under normal operating conditions the drum mass was entered automatically from a 
download of the data from TRIPS. Since a zero matrix was not a real waste form no corrective action was required. 
In order to take advantage of those cases where data had been taken on the SGRS assay system under the mass ratio 
mode and certified the data for the absolute analysis mode, a provision was included in SAP, which allowed the 
previous data to be recalculated to produce absolute assay results without requiring re-assay. The decision was made 
to not implement this provision. Additionally when the SGRS Absolute software was placed in production, a 
decision to not implement any recalculation in TRIPS was made. This decision was the primary reason drums were 
not certified for shipment to WIPP by this instrument. The data validation process would often cause a drum to be 
reworked (i.e. such as reweighing the drum) after the radioassay had to be completed. The rework of the drum 
would not alter the data calculated/sent to WIPP but TRIPS would reflect newer information was available, and 
according to data validation procedures this would require the drum to be recalculated in TRIPS. The result was 
drums were permanently rejected because SGRS absolute was not WIPP certified to recalculate drums in TRIPS. 
CONCLUSION 
Over time, the RWMC Radioassay program adapted, modified, and expanded its methods and systems to meet 
changing requirements and needs over the entire lifespan of the project. The changes made and lesson learned were 
made to overcome limitations uncovered during testing and operations, to incorporate advances in hardware 
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capability, to augment production throughput and reliability, to utilize improvements in algorithms, to include 
uncertainty determinations, and to improve data handling interfaces. As a result of a very active technical oversight 
team, general assumptions and broad statements were challenged and the experience gained should be a pattern to 
emulate in further NDA development and operations activities. It was found that each waste form and, in some cases 
an individual drum, represented a unique challenge in interpreting the assay data. As a result, the NDA 
hardwares/softwares/operating procedures were continuously updated and upgraded. The state of the assay systems 
and methodologies at the close of the 3100 m3 Project reflects a long list of applied knowledge and experiences: 
x There is no one assay technique that can be applied to all waste forms. 
x The waste assay technique must be appropriate to the waste form and waste matrix. 
x The knowledge of the waste form and packaging is absolutely necessary and should be as extensive as 
possible. 
x The limitations of each assay technique must be well known. 
x Calibration techniques, which are applicable for one technique, are not necessarily applicable to other 
techniques.  As a result, calibration requirements need to be flexible enough to take advantage of advanced 
and different NDA methods. 
x Calibration efforts must be rigorous and well documented. 
x Throughput requirements should be well defined. 
x Accuracy and precision goals should be well defined. 
x Sensitivity goals should be well defined. 
x Quality assurance methods should be well defined. 
x Software and Program Documentation should be considered as “Living Documents”. 
x Automation of functions is the most desirable solution to “Special Cases”. 
x Advantageous to have well trained and experienced personnel. 
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